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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

CAROLYN CRUMP n/k/a
CAROLYN FORSGREN,

*
*

PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI

Plaintiff/Respondent,
*
vs.

Court of Appeals Case No.
900362-CA

*

ROBERT CRUMP,
*

Utah
Supreme
Case No.

Court

Defendant/Appellant.

Plaintiff/Respondent, Carolyn Forsgren, by and through counsel,
hereby petitions the Utah Supreme Court for a Writ of Certiorari to
review the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals entered in the aboveentitled action on or about November 22, 1991, the Honorable Norman H.
Jackson, Judge, the Honorable Reginal W. Garff, Judge, Concurring, and
the Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Judge, Dissenting.

QUESTION FOR REVIEW
Plaintiff/Respondent requests this Court to review the following
issue:

Does Utah, under the facts and circumstances presented in this

case, and pursuant to the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
("UCCJA") and the Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act ("PKPA"),
have jurisdiction to initially hear Defendant's Petition to Modify a
Montana Decree of Divorce regarding custody and to subsequently hear
Defendant/Appellant's appeal?

1

REFERENCE TO COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
The official opinion of the Court of Appeals was filed on November
22, 1991.

The opinion is published in Crump v. Crump, 174 Utah Adv.

Rpts. 20 (C.A. 11/22/91) •

A copy of the opinion is included in the

appendix, and will be referred to as the "Opinion" hereinafter.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to Rule 45, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, and jurisdiction is further shown as
follows:
A*

The date of entry of the decision sought to be

reviewed is November 22, 1991.
B.

This Court granted an Order for Extension of Time

on December 19, 1991, as per the Honorable Richard C. Howe.
No Motion for rehearing was requested.

in

C.

This is the initial Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

D#

This Court has jurisdiction to review the decision

question

by

Writ

of

Certiorari

by

virtue

of

the

Constitution of Utah, Article 8, Section 1, et. seq., Section
78-2-1 et. seq., Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended, and Rules
45 and 46 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
i.

The

specific

consideration

governing

review of certiorari pursuant to Rule 46f Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, is subparagraph (d) #
"When

the

Court

of

Appeals

has

decided

an

important question of municipal, state, or federal
law which has not been, but should be, settled by

2

the Supreme Court."

The dismissal of the appeal

and the entire case for lack of jurisdiction under
the facts of the case appears to be an incident of
first

impression

in

Utah

and

was

strongly

dissented to by Judge Leonard H. Russon.
ii.

Respondent

further believes that the

majority opinion of the Court of Appeals is not
consistent with other decisions of the Court of
Appeals or the Utah Supreme Court, and has so far
departed from the stated purposes of the UCCJA and
PKPA as adopted by the Utah State Legislature and
the Congress of the United States, respectively,
as to call for an exercise of the Supreme Court's
power of supervision.

(Judge Russon, in his

dissenting opinion, further suggests that review
by writ of certiorari may be necessary to resolve
the controversy. See Opinion, footnote 18, p. 24)

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction involves the
Court of Appeals' interpretation of the UCCJA, Section 78-45c-l, et.
seq., Utah Code Ann., and the PKPA, 28 U.S.C. Section 1738A (1989).
The pertinent provisions of each of those controlling statutes are set
forth in the appendix.

In addition, though not addressed in the

Opinion, Respondent believes the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, Section 7822a-l, et. seq., is also important in this action.
provisions thereof are also included in the appendix.

3

The applicable

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE. This appeal was from the final Order of

Judge Gordon J. Low, denying Robert Crump's Petition to Modify a
Montana

Custody

Order.

Carolyn

Crump, n/k/a

Carolyn

Forsgren,

hereinafter referred to as Mrs. Crump, filed a Counter Petition to
Modify the same Order to grant her sole custody of the children, to
increase child support, and obtain a judgment for back child support.
There was no cross appeal of the District Court's Order denying Mrs.
Crump's Counter Petition. However, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
appeal and underlying petition for lack of jurisdiction since Mr. Crump
continues to reside in Montana, even though Mr. Crump filed this action
in Utah.
B*

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. Mrs. Crump moved from Montana to Utah

on or about September 1983.

The parties were granted a Decree of

Divorce by a Montana District Court on December 7, 1983.

In August,

1985, the Montana District Court awarded Mr. and Mrs. Crump joint legal
custody of the children with primary physical custody awarded to Mrs.
Crump.
In February of 1989, Mr. Crump filed the Montana Custody Decree in
the First District Court of Utah, in and for Cache County, pursuant to
the Utah Foreign Judgment Act, Section 78-22a-l, et. seq., Utah Code
Annotated. Notice of the Foreign Judgment was delivered to Mrs. Crump
by the Clerk of the District Court.

At or about the saiae time, Mr.

Crump filed a Petition to Modify the Montana Decree in Utah, requesting
the Utah court to award him custody of the parties' four (4) children.
Trial was held before the Honorable Gordon J. Low on April 24, and
May 4, 1990.

The Findings, Conclusions, and Order were entered by
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Judge Low on June 12, 1990, with an Amended Order entered on July 16,
1990.

The initial appeal was filed on July 13, 1990.

There was no

cross-appeal.
After briefs had been completed, oral argument on Mr. Crump's
appeal was scheduled for August 27, 1991. However, approximately three
(3) weeks prior to oral argument, the Court of Appeals notified counsel
for each party of a possible jurisdictional infirmity and requested
responses from each party.

(See appendix, letter from Mary T. Noonan

dated August

Mrs. Crump

jurisdiction.

6,

1991.)

argued . in

favor of Utah's

Ironically, Mr. Crump argued that Utah did not have

jurisdiction even though he had filed his petition in Utah.
On August 26, 1991, the day prior to oral argument, the Court of
Appeals informed counsel that oral argument had been canceled and a
written decision would be issued.
The Utah Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction by its Opinion and Order entered on November 22, 1991.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The marriage of the parties was dissolved by a Decree of the

District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District of Montana in and for
the County of Lake on December 7, 1983. (R.10) At the time the Decree
was entered, Mrs. Crump was a resident of Utah, having moved to Utah in
or about September 1983. (R. Vol II, p. 10-12)
2.

The parties by agreement disposed of their property and

marital debts which was approved by the Montana District Court by a
Supplemental Decree issued on or about April 6, 1984.
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3.

A hearing regarding permanent custody, child support, and

attorney's fees was held before Judge Robert M. Holter, District Judge,
on June 6, 1985. The Court heard testimony and interviewed the parties
four

(4) minor children.

The Montana Court thereafter issued a

Judgment of custody and visitation on August 19, 1985, awarding the
parties joint custody with the primary residence of the children being
with Carolyn during the school year and with Defendant/Appellant,
Robert Crump during the summer vacation.
4.

At the time the Custody Decree was issued, Mrs. Crump and the

children had been living in Utah for approximately two (2) years.
5.

Mr. Crump filed an authenticated copy of the Montana Decree

of Divorce in the First Judicial District Court, County of Cache, State
of Utah, in or about February 1989, under the Utah Foreign Judgment Act
and provided notice pursuant to the Act to Mrs. Crump. Mr. Crump also
filed a Petition to Modify the Montana Decree of Divorce and served the
same upon Mrs. Crump.
6.

The children had been living in Utah approximately 5 1/2

years at the time the Petition to Modify Decree was filed and it had
been approximately 3 1/2 years since the entry of the Montana Custody
Decree.
7.

The hearing on Defendant's Petition to Modify was held before

Judge Gordon J. Low, District Judge, on April 24, and May 4, 1990.
Judge Low issued his Memorandum Decision May 16, 1990, refusing to
modify the custody provisions of the Montana Decree and slightly
altering the visitation provisions of the Decree.
modified the child support provisions of the Decree.
(R. 277-287)
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Judge Low also

8.

As of this date, the children have resided in Utah for more

than eight (8) years and it has been almost six and one-half years (6
1/2) years since the entry of the Montana Custody Decree.
9.

Mr. Crump continues to reside in Montana.

ARGUMENT
UTAH HAS CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
OVER THE PARTIES AND THE SUBJECT
MATTER IN THIS ACTION AND SHOULD
EXERCISE ITS JURISDICTION.
The Opinion and Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the
Utah Action for lack of jurisdiction is a split decision with a strong
dissent by Judge Leonard H. Russon. The majority, as authored by Judge
Norman H. Jackson, with a concurrence by Judge Reginal W. Garff,
essentially

contends

that

no

concurrent

jurisdiction

exists

in

considering a modification of an existing out of state child custody
decree. The majority contends that pursuant to the UCCJA and the PKPA,
in order for Utah to have jurisdiction to modify the Montana Decree in
this action, either none of the parties must remain a resident of the
Decree state, i.e. Montana, or the Montana Court must enter an Order
deferring

its

jurisdiction

to Utah.

Without

one of those two

conditions, claims the majority, Utah does not and never will have
jurisdiction.
The dissenting opinion, which is supported by Mrs. Crump, contends
that since the children have resided in Utah for a period in excess of
six consecutive months (in this case, more than eight years), Utah is
the home state as defined in Section 78-45c-3, Utah Code Ann. (1987),
and therefore, has concurrent jurisdiction. The determination the Utah
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Court must make when and if considering jurisdiction is WHETHER TO
EXERCISE that jurisdiction.

Judge Russon contends that Utah has

jurisdiction in the case at bar and that Utah should also exercise its
jurisdiction, especially where Mr. Crump has filed his Petition in Utah
and has proceeded in Utah without any objection or concern about Utah's
jurisdiction, until, of course, the issue was first raised by the Court
of Appeals.
In considering the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, it should be
stressed that Mr. Crump voluntarily filed his petition to modify the
Montana Decree in Utah and neither Judge Low nor counsel, including
current counsel, even considered the possibility of a jurisdictional
defect, let alone raise the issue.

Simply put, this is not a

jurisdictional dispute between the parties.

Jurisdiction was first

raised as a potential issue only three (3) weeks prior to scheduled
oral argument being held.
A.

REVIEW OF THE MAJORITY POSITION.

Each of the Utah cases cited by the majority was brought to the
Court of Appeals as a jurisdictional dispute. In Curtis v. Curtis, 789
P.2d 717, (Utah App. 1990) the original Decree was issued by Utah's
Fourth District Court on December 4, 1987.

Approximately two months

later, Mr. Curtis took the children from Utah to Mississippi on an
alleged visitation and then refused to return the children.

After

filing two (2) petitions in Mississippi seeking to modify the Utah
Decree,

Mr. Curtis was finally able to obtain a custody order in

Mississippi.
Although

a

Utah

Fourth

District

Court

Domestic

Relations

Commissioner had concluded that Mississippi did not have jurisdiction
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to modify the divorce decree because Utah had never relinquished
jurisdiction,

and

had

recommended

against

enforcement

of

the

Mississippi order and in favor of issuing a restraining order against
Mr. Curtis, neither the Mississippi Court nor the Utah Court followed
that recommendation.

Prior to his decision, the Utah District Judge,

who had entered the initial Utah Decree, conferred by telephone with
the Mississippi judge.

And even though both Courts recognized that

only one court had authority to exercise jurisdiction over the Divorce
Decree, the Utah Court concluded that since Mrs. Curtis had made a
"general appearance" in Mississippi during a three day hearing in
February 1988, she had submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the
Mississippi Court.

The District Court thereupon dismissed Mrs.

Curtis's Order to Show Cause and granted Mr. Curtis's motion to enforce
the Mississippi order.
Upon appeal, the decision of the district judge was set aside
since Utah had jurisdiction and continued to have jurisdiction as long
as Mrs. Curtis continued to reside in Utah.
In State in Interest of D.S.K., 792 P.2d at 118, (Utah App. 1990),
the parties resided in Florida at the time the Divorce Decree was
entered. The Mother had moved with the children to Utah and then moved
to California during the pendency of the Utah action. Father sought to
have the Decree modified in Utah, while mother was still in Utah, only
two (2) weeks after the entry of the final decree in Florida.

Even

though the Utah Juvenile Court had communicated with the Florida Court
and each had agreed Florida retained modification jurisdiction, the
Utah Court proceeded on a dependency and neglect hearing and granted
custody to the Father.

The Court of Appeals ruled that since Father
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continued to reside in Florida, and mother did not reside in Utah,
jurisdiction continued in Florida and Utah had no jurisdiction to
modify the Decree.
The majority opinion does not cite a case in which an appellate
court for the first time considered the issue of jurisdiction. Each of
the cases referred to in the majority opinion dealt with a dispute in
the trial court as to the Court's jurisdiction and, for the most part,
those cases were properly decided in conformity with the purposes and
provisions of the UCCJA and the PKPA. The majority appears, therefore,
to anchor its opinion on the assumption that the PKPA differs from the
UCCJA

in

that

the

PKPA

allegedly

"anchors

exclusive

continuing

jurisdiction to modify a previous custody decree in the original home
state as long as the child or one of the contestants remains in that
state," citing Annotation, 83 A.L.R. 4th 742 at 748 (emphasis in
Opinion).
The applicable section of the PKPA states as follows:
(f) A court of a state may modify a determination of the
custody of the same child made by a court of another state if
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child
custody determination; and
(2) the court of the other state no longer has
jurisdiction, or it has declined to exercise such
jurisdiction to modify such determination.
28 U.S.C. Section 1738A(f) 1989.
The corresponding provision in the UCCJA dealing with modification
of foreign decrees is found in Section 78-45c-14, U.C.A., and states as
follows:
(1) If a court of another state has made a custody decree,
the court of this state shall not modify that decree unless
(a) it appears to the court of this state that the court
which rendered the decree does not now have jurisdiction
10

under
jurisdictional
prerequisites
substantially
in
accordance with this act or has declined to assume
jurisdiction to modify the decree and (b) the court of this
state has jurisdiction.
It appears to this writer that the only difference between the two
sections is that the UCCJA adds "under jurisdictional prerequisites
substantially in accordance with this act," in determining if the
decree state still has jurisdiction.

In other words, both provisions

require the modification state to determine if the decree state still
has jurisdiction.

Both also recognize that jurisdiction may be

concurrent since the PKPA allows the modifying state to exercise its
jurisdiction if the decree state has "declined to exercise such
jurisdiction."

However, both are very clear that if the decree state

still has jurisdiction, which is a question which should be considered
by both courts in consultation with each other considering the best
interests

of the child, and has not deferred

or declined

that

jurisdiction, the modifying state may not exercise its jurisdiction.
It also appears quite clear, contrary to the assumption of the
majority, that the PKPA does not create jurisdiction, but merely
directs or limits the exercise of jurisdiction.

"A child custody

determination made by a court of this state is consistent with the
provisions of this section only if - (1) such court has jurisdiction
under the law of such state;" 28 U.S.C. Section 1738a(c)(l). The PKPA
also includes:
(g) a court of a state shall not exercise jurisdiction in
any proceeding for a custody determination commenced during
the pendency of a proceeding in a court of another state
where such court of that other state is exercising
11

jurisdiction consistently with the provisions of this section
to make a custody determination.
28 U.S.C. Section 1738a(g)
The

PKPA,

therefore,

from the

clear

language

of

the act,

recognizes that each state, under its own state laws, may have
jurisdiction over the decree.

Jurisdiction in Utah is established

pursuant to Section 30-3-1 et. seq., Utah Code Ann. and the Utah UCCJA,
78-45c-l, et. seq., Utah Code Ann.
Our courts have also previously recognized the possibility of
concurrent jurisdiction:
The unilateral filing of a petition in one state does not
prohibit the filing of a petition in another state which also
has jurisdiction. Peterson v. Peterson, 464 A. 2nd, 202, 205
(Me. 1983). But more importantly, the purpose of Section 7845c-6(l) "is to encourage judicial restraint in exercising
jurisdiction whenever another state appears to be in a better
position to determine custody of a child" 9 UCCJA (U.L.A.)
Section 7, Comment, 234 (1988).
Ultimately, it is -less
important which court exercises jurisdiction but that courts
of several states involved act in partnership to bring about
the best possible solution for a child's future." 9 UCCJA
(U.L.A.) preferatory note, 118 (1988) (emphasis added in
opinion) [citations omitted]
W.D. , In Re: v. Drake, 770 P.2d 1011, 1015 (Utah App. 1989),
The

majority

also

suggests

that

Mrs.

Crump

argued

that

jurisdiction automatically shifted to Utah, the new home state, when
she and the children moved there. That assumption is incorrect. Mrs.
Crump merely argues, as does Judge Russon in the dissenting opinion,
that Utah has concurrent jurisdiction and has the riglit to determine
whether to exercise that jurisdiction.

Although Mr. Crump could very

well have filed his Petition in Montana, which would &ave required a
response in Montana, (which response may have included a request for
12

the Montana court to defer jurisdiction to Utah on a finding of
inconvenient forum pursuant to Section 7 of the UCCJA), Mr. Crump chose
to proceed with his Petition in Utah and file the Montana Decree in
Utah as a foreign judgment entitled to full faith and credit, thereby
effectively waiving any objection to Utah's authority to exercise its
jurisdiction.
B.

REVIEW OF THE DISSENTING POSITION.

Mrs. Crump believes that the arguments of the dissenting opinion
are far better suited to the instant action than the arguments raised
by the majority. Although this writer does not purport to assume that
he can improve on Judge Russon's opinion, and refers this Court to
Judge Russon's dissent and the excellent analysis and arguments made
therein, Mrs. Crump would like to provide some additional information
to this Court.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Russon mentions that the Crump
children have been in Utah for over two years. Actually, the children
have been in Utah since September 1983, which is now over eight years.
Although the children have visited with their father in Montana during
the summers and other periods, the substantial evidence relating to
their past, present, and future care, training, and protection is in
Utah.
All of the applicable provisions of the PKPA and UCCJA favor Utah
exercising jurisdiction.

For example, each of the factors enumerated

in Section 7(3) of the UCCJA in determining the most convenient forum
favors Utah.

Those factors are as follows:

(3) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the court
shall consider if it is in the interest of the child that
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another state assume jurisdiction. For this purpose it may
take into account the following factors, among others:
(a) if another state is or recently was the
child's home state;
(b) if another state has a closer connection with
the child and his family or with the child and one
or more of the contestants;
(c) if substantial evidence concerning the
child's present or future care, protection,
training, and personal relationships is more
readily available in another state;
(d) if the parties have agreed on another forum
which is no less appropriate; and
(e) if the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of
this state would contravene any of the purposes
stated in Section 78-45c-l.
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-45c-7(3) (1980).

In applying those factors to the instant action:
(a) Home State. Since the children have been residing in
Utah now for approximately 8 years, Utah is clearly the
children's home state.
(b) Close Connections. Although the children spend summer
visitation with their father in Montana, the majority of
their time is spent in Utah. Their teachers reside in Utah
as well as other family members, friends, religious
instructors, medical providers, and other people who are
familiar with the children.
(c) Substantial Evidence. Since Utah law requires Mr. Crump
to show a substantial and material change in Mrs. Crump's
circumstances and ONLY as those circumstances impact on her
parenting ability and the functioning of the custodial
relationship, the court is able to only hear testimony and
first determine if there has been a material change in
circumstance on Mrs. Crump's circumstances before considering
the children's best interests since this was originally a
contested, litigated custody matter. The only evidence the
court can hear regarding the children's present and future
care, protection, training, and personal relationships is
available in Utah.
(d) Agreement of Parties. The parties have obviously agreed
on Utah as being the most appropriate forum to proceed in
this action.

14

(e) Purpose of Act.
The purposes of the act would be
defeated if Montana were to retain jurisdiction in lieu of
deferring jurisdiction to Utah.
The stated purposes of the UCCJA also almost exclusively support
jurisdiction being exercised in Utah.

Those factors are:

(a) avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict with
courts of other states in matters of child custody which have
in the past resulted in the shifting of children from state
to state with harmful effects on their well-being;
(b) promote cooperation with the courts of other states to
the end that a custody decree is rendered in that state which
can best decide the case in the interests of the child;
(c) assure that litigation concerning the custody of the
child take place ordinarily in the state with which the child
and his family have the closest connection and where
significant evidence concerning his care, protection,
training, and personal relationships is most readily
available, and that courts of this state decline the exercise
of jurisdiction when the child and his family have a closer
connection with another state;
(d) discourage continuing controversies over child custody
in the interest of greater stability of home environment and
of secure family relationships for the child;
(e) deter abductions and other unilateral
children undertaken to obtain custody awards;

removals of

(f) avoid re-litigation of custody decisions of other states
and this state in so far as feasible;
(g) facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other
states;
(h) promote and expand the exchange of information and other
forms of mutual assistance between the courts of this state
and those of other states concerned with the same child; and
(i) to make uniform the law of those states which it acted.
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-45c-1.
As included in the appendix, the purposes of the PKPA are also
very similar to the purposes of the UCCJA.

By ruling that Utah does

not have jurisdiction and dismissing the action, the majority opinion
15

is showing callous disregard for the purposes of the PKPA and the UCCJA
in favor of its strict and rigid interpretation of one provision of the
PKPA.

The Court of Appeals has now caused a jurisdictional conflict

rather than seeking to avoid a jurisdictional conflict where none
existed.

The Court of Appeals has given no concern to discussion

between Utah and Montana in order to determine which state can best
decide the case in the interest of the children. The Court of Appeals
decision may also require that litigation concerning custody of the
children take place in the state which has the least significant
connections concerning their care, protection, and training and where
the least evidence is available.

Although Mrs. Crump may further

petition Montana to defer its jurisdiction to Utah, (should Mr. Crump
proceed with an action in Montana), even if Montana defers its
jurisdiction to Utah as the most convenient forum the Court of Appeals
has assured that the controversy over the custody of these children
will continue, causing a substantial impact on the stability of their
home environment and their family relationship.

The Court of Appeals

has also essentially assured that re-litigation will occur requiring
the children to again be submitted to the unfortunate emotional trauma
surrounding such on-going litigation.
Rather than allow such egregious circumstances to continue, this
Court should grant the Petition for Writ of Certiorari and overrule the
decision of the Court of Appeals and confirm the jurisdiction of tjhe
Utah Courts.

If the decision is upheld, Mr. Crump essentially is

offered another bite at the apple through no fault of Mrs. Crump, the
trial judge, or her trial counsel.
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C.

ALTERNATIVE ACTION.

As an alternative to either affirming or setting aside the
Opinion, this Court can also allow communication between the Courts of
Utah and Montana to resolve any jurisdictional problem.

One of the

most important purposes of both the PKPA and the UCCJA, as noted in the
decisions cited by both the majority and dissenting opinions, is to
require the courts of each of the states to communicate with one
another in an effort to determine which court is better suited to
exercise its jurisdiction.

As pointed out in Justice Stewart's

dissenting opinion in Coppedge v. Harding, 714 P.2d 1121 (Utah 1985),
courts should generally communicate with each other prior to rendering
any decisions.
In the instant action, there was no need to communicate with
Montana since the question of jurisdiction was not an issue, either for
the parties or the Court. Now that jurisdiction has been made an issue
by the Court of Appeals, a most reasonable approach, short of reversing
the Court

of Appeals decision

and holding that Utah does have

jurisdiction, is for this action to be remanded to the trial court for
a determination of whether jurisdiction should be exercised. The Utah
Court

can

then

communicate

with

the

Montana

court

regarding

jurisdiction. And, if Montana is so inclined, Judge Low can supplement
and/or correct the original record pursuant to Rule 60(a), U.R.C.P., to
include a finding that Montana has deferred its jurisdiction to Utah
(if such is the case) and enter an Order regarding jurisdiction.
Such a procedure was conducted in Dennis v. Dennis,, 366 N.W. 2nd,
474 (N.D. 1985), as reported in 83 A.L.R. 4th 742, 765:
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Although it was undisputed that a father was a contestant in
a custody dispute and continued to reside in North Dakotaf
the court in Dennis v. Dennis, (1985, N.D.) 366 N.W. 2nd,
474, held that North Dakota did not meet the requirements for
continuing jurisdiction over the father's motion to modify
the original North Dakota custody decree under 28 U.S.C.S.
Section 1738A(d), where Iowa, not North Dakota, was currently
the children's home state, and it was impossible to determine
from the trial court's order if it had considered whether it
had jurisdiction under Section 3(a)(2) of the UCCJA, since
continued residency of the father in North Dakota was alone
insufficient to establish continuing jurisdiction. The Court
accordingly reversed and remanded the trial court's dismissal
of the father's motion for a redetermination of the
jurisdictional issue. The original Decree awarded the mother
custody of the children and granted the father reasonable
rights of visitation, with alternative visitation provided
which was to become effective upon the anticipated move of
the mother and children to Iowa, which occurred about a month
later. About three years later, the father filed his request
to modify the visitation provisions of the original decree.
Rejecting the father's argument that the PKPA required the
trial court to assume jurisdiction because he was a
contestant who currently resided in North Dakota, the court
observed that in order for a North Dakota court to assume
modification jurisdiction under section 1738A(d), the North
Dakota court must currently meet the jurisdiction
requirements of section 3(a) of the UCCJA. The couirt noted
that subsequent to entry of an original custody decree by the
child's home state, another state can become the home state
and can obtain jurisdiction to modify the other state's
original decree.
The court pointed out that the
determination of whether the trial court had significant
connection jurisdiction was a question which should be
determined by the trial court.
On remand, the trial court determined that it had signAficant
connection jurisdiction under Section 3(a)(2), but declined
to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 7 because Iowa was
a more appropriate forum for litigating the father's motion,
and that decision was upheld in Dennis v. Dennis (19$S> N.D.)
387 N.W. 2d 234.
The authors of the A.L.R. Annotation (which is quoted by the
majority for the proposition that the PKPA anchors exclusive continuing
jurisdiction to modify a previous custody decree in the original home
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state as long as the child or one of the contestants remains in that
state) further point out:
This preference [of exclusive decree state modification
jurisdiction] has been criticized by some for being arguably
arbitrary, capricious, and somewhat anomalous since it
differs from the UCCJA.
[See Foster, "Child Custody
Jurisdiction: UCCJA and PKPA, " 27 NY Law School L. Rev. 297
(1981).]
Others view it more favorably, noting that it
establishes
a
threshold
criterion
for
continuing
jurisdiction, which may prevent a rendering state from
abusing the concept that its jurisdiction, once exercised,
continues to the exclusion of all other states. [See Coombs,
"Interstate Child Custody, Jurisdiction, Recognition, and
Enforcement," 66 Minn. L. Rev. 711 (June, 1982)] One way
around the unfortunate rigidity created by 1738A(d) is selfrestraint and commitment to the objectives of the UCCJA and
the
PKPA,
including
the
provisions
for
declining
jurisdiction.
83 A.L.R. 4th 742 at 748.
The majority would do well to take note of the unfortunate
consequences of its rigid position in dismissing this action, (which
was filed in 1989, requiring two days of hearing and which has already
taken a substantial financial and emotional toll on all parties
involved) in favor of self-restraint and a commitment to the purposes
of the UCCJA and PKPA, which almost exclusively favor Utah exercising
its jurisdiction in this matter.

CONCLUSIONS
Since the effects of the Court of Appeals decision are far more
reaching than this case, this Court should carefully examine the
decision of the Court of Appeals and allow the parties to present their
arguments to the Court prior to any final determination.

As pointed

out earlier, the Court of Appeals heard no argument from the parties
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and only allowed approximately ten days for the parties to submit
memoranda on a jurisdictional issue the parties had no idea existed
until three (3) weeks prior to scheduled oral argument.
Plaintiff/Respondent respectfully requests this Court to grant
this Petition for Writ of Certiorari to consider the correctness of the
Court of Appeals' decision in dismissing this action for lack of
jurisdiction or to consider other alternative action.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

/7

day of January, 1992

Step^ehJW^ Jewell, J
Attorrusftyfor
PlainxOr /Respondent

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing
WRIT OF CERTIORARI were mailed, postage pre-paid , this
/ 7
day of
Januaryf 1992, to Robert A. Echard, Attorney for Defendant/Appellant,
at 635 - 25th Street, Ogden, Utah 84401.

^AJU£(7
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JACKSON, Judge:
Robert Crump appeals the lower court's denial of his
petition to modify a Montana court's award of joint custody to
him and Carolyn Crump, of their four children. We dismiss the
appeal.
FACTS
Mr. and Mrs. Crump were granted a decree of divorce on
December 7, 1983, by a Montana district court. Prior to a
hearing on the issue of child custody, Mrs. Crump moved with the
parties' four children from Montana to Utah. In August 1985, the
Montana district court awarded Mr. Crump and Mrs. Crump joint
legal custody of the children, with primary physical custody
awarded to Mrs. Crump. In February 1989, Mr. Crump filed a
petition in Utah to modify the Montana custody decree. The
petition alleged a material change of circumstances, and urged
that Mr. Crump be awarded primary physical custody of the
children. Mr. Crump resided in Montana at the time he filed his
petition, and has been a resident of that state at all times
relevant to the present case. On April 24 and May 4 of 1990, the

trial court in Utah heard evidence and denied the petition to
modify the prior custody decree. However, the court made a
slight change in the visitation provisions and modified the child
support provisions of that decree.
Mr. Crump appeals the trial court's denial of his petition
to modify the custody order. On appeal, Mr. Crump raises three
issues, claiming: (1) the trial court committed error in applying
the standard for reviewing a petition to modify a child custody
award; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in not modifying
the award; and (3) the trial court committed error in failing to
admit certain evidence.
JURISDICTION
A threshold issue is whether or not this court has
jurisdiction to hear the appeal. If a court l^^^s_n^rJ.sdiction
"it has not power to entertain the suit. ft^S!^^P^^^g^^fciB*f T^9
P.2d 717, 726 (Utah App. 1990) (citation Omitted). Not only can
a court not entertain the suit, the parties cannot cure the
jurisdictional defect by waiver or consent. Mrs. Crump's
argument, and the dissent's assertion that because "Mr. Crump
voluntarily and affirmatively engaged the Utah courts . . . he
waived any question regarding authority of the Utah courts to
decide the issue . . . and has thus waived any objection to the
district court's authority to exercise its jurisdiction," is
without merit. We have held that
while defects in personal jurisdiction can be
waived, subject matter jurisdiction goes to
the very power of a court to entertain an
action. A lack of subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be stipulated around nor
cured by a waiver. A lack of subject matter
jurisdiction can be raised at any time and
when subject matter jurisdiction does not
exist, neither the parties nor the court can
do anything to fill that void.
Id» (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The issue of waiver
has been addressed by this court, see id., by our supreme court,
and by the federal courts of appeal. See, e.g. , JS^^PaaUd v.
JwnmM*nWFY?Z& 146^5, 1484-85 Ulth Cir.i , cert, ^denied by
SEEIJL^^
T^^)
(NO
waiver of jurisdictional defect in modification of child custody
case even where father had consented to jurisdiction of
Washington court, which court did not.l^ave jurisdiction); AZ3V*
Mad**?'f&Tirr^tBittoimtx^
Co. . Inc. I 817 P. 2d 323, 325 (Utah
1991) (fl[A]cquiescence of the parties is insufficient to confer

jurisdiction on the court, and a lack of jurisdiction can be
raised by the court or either party at any time."); see also
Annotation, Child Custody: When Does State That Issued Previous
Custody Determination Have Continuing Jurisdiction Under Uniform
Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA) Or Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 USCS S 1738A, 83 A.L.R.4th 742, 748
(1991) [hereinafter Annotation] (citation omitted) ("[SJubject
matter jurisdiction under [the relevant child custody statutes]
cannot be vested by agreement of the parties, even though all of
the parties desire an adjudication on the merits, and such
jurisdiction cannot be conferred on the court by a party's
failure to interpose a timely objection to the court's assumption
of jurisdiction."). Therefore, we must determine if, under the
applicable statutes, the courts of this state have jurisdiction
to modify the Montana child custody award, and not ignore this
issue on the basis of waiver simply because Mr. Crump came to
Utah to initiate the action.
A.

Jurisdiction under the PKPA

Congress adopted the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
(PKPA), the jurisdictional provisions of which are codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1738A (1989), to create a national standard that the
states could look to in interstate child custody disputes. See
generally Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-611, § 7, (1980), 94 Stat. 3569. The PKPA was created in part
to solve problems that the Uniform Child Custody Jyyc^djjqtion Act
(UCCJA) had not successfully addressed.
S$^^WWMY&&£»6f
^gP^g^^^^jj^Ppipl^^^^ 1990) (citations omitted)
"Wfierer tht PRParinff tM^s€aT€e''V version of the UCCJA conflict,
the PKPA preempts state law." Xd. (citations omitted). Because
the PKPA "directly address the issues before this court, creates
a very manageable two-prong test for determining modification
jurisdiction, and would govern in the event of conflict with the
UCCJA or oizher srate law,1' Curtis, 789 P.2d at 720, we focus our
analysis on this federal statute.
One problem that the UCCJA failed to address was a specific
prov^j^Qpi^or continuing jurisdiction. Annotation, ff^S^^E^ttte
g ^ B H M K ^ T h e r e f o r e / t h e potential existed for concurrent^^"^
1. In the present case, the result is the same under the UCCJA
and the PKPA, although the PKPA uses language more specific than
the UCCJA in addressing jurisdiction in the modification context.
2. "However, the provisions of § 14 of the UCCJA, along with the
Commissioners' Notes to that section, have been interpreted to
(continued...)

jurisdiction between two states. Dickens, The Parental
Kidnapping Act: Application and Interpretation, 23 J. Fam. L.
419, 426-27 (1984-85) [hereinafter Dickens]. The PKPA eliminates
"the possibility of concurrent jurisdiction by conferring
exclusive modification jurisdiction upon the home state of the
child (i.e., the state which rendered the initial decree)." Id.
at 426 (citing The Effect of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act of 1980 on Child Snatching, 17 New Eng. L. Rev. 499, 511
(Spring 1982)).
Unlike the UCCJA, the PKPA "anchors exclusive continuing
jurisdiction to modify a previous custody decree in the original
home state as long as the child or one of the contestants remains
in that state." Annotation, 83 A.L.R.4th at 748 (emphasis
added). See also Dickens, 23 J. Fam. L. at 426. "While under
the UCCJA scheme some states profess to find modification
jurisdiction so long as they can properly exercise initial
custody jurisdiction, the PKPA prevents a second state from
modifying an initial state's order except in carefully
circumscribed situations."
iJfi^^^Hlj^gJ^^^^^p^pf^^^H^^ail^y^^^''"T473 . 1476
(4th Cir. 1987). This is clear^'fgtftr&gctiairXTf^oT^nie
PKPA
which states that
A court of a State may modify a
determination of the custody of the same
child made by a court of another State, if —
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a
child custody determination; and
(2) the court of the other State no
longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined
to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such
determination.
28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1989) (emphasis added).
This section explicitly limits when a state, which would
otherwise have jurisdiction over a child custody dispute, must
defer to the state which originally issued the custody order.3
"The PKPA is a departure from the jurisdictional requirements of
the UCCJA and this departure is critical to the efficacy of the
2.
(...continued)
establish exclusive continuing jurisdiction of the state that
made the initial custody determination." Annotation, 83
A.L.R.4th at 748.
3. Specifically the PKPA provides that states shall not modify
custody orders of another state "except as provided in subsection
(f) of this section," 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (1989).

A

new Act because a state court may no longer modify existing
decrees of other states pursuant to the various and flexible
bases of jurisdiction provided in the UCCJA." Dickens, 23 J.
Fam. L. at 426. Further, this court has held "the language [of
the PKPA] clearly eliminates the possibility of concurrent
jurisdiction by conferring exclusive jurisdiction upon the state
which rendered the initial decree[.]" State in Interest of
D.S.K., 792 P.2d at 129. See also Dickens, 23 J. Fam. L. at 42627 (PKPA precludes a state court to modify existing decrees of
other states when state which issued decree maintains
jurisdiction).
In the present case, both prongs of the jurisdictional test
must be addressed. While a state may "have jurisdiction to make
such a child custody determination[,] . . ."28 U.S.C. § 1738A
(1989), it must decline to exercise that jurisdiction unless "the
court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has
declined to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such
determination." Id.4 While Utah may have had jurisdiction to
issue the original order in this case, e.g., meeting the
requirements of subsection (1), Utah does not have jurisdiction
to modify an order from Montana because Montana has continuing
exclusive jurisdiction.
B. Jurisdiction under the UCCJA
The decision we have reached conforms with comparable
provisions of the UCCJA. The UCCJA was created to "avoid
jurisdiction competition and conflict with courts of other states
in matters of child custody," Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-1 (1987),
"promote cooperation with the courts of other states," id..
4. See also Meade v. Meade, 812 F.2d 1473, 1476 (4th Cir. 1987)
(Virginia trial court properly exercised jurisdiction over
modification of custody case as Virginia had continuing and
exclusive jurisdiction); McDouaald v. Jenson. 786 F.2d 1465, 1481
(11th Cir.), cert, denied by Jenson v. McDouaald, 479 U.S. 860,
107 S. Ct. 207 (1986) (no question that under PKPA, Florida, the
state which issued initial custody decree, and not Washington,
where mother and child later resided, maintained and properly
exercised jurisdiction to modify custody decree); Appleaate v.
Gant, 460 So.2d 1293, 1294 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (Alabama court
had no jurisdiction to modify Texas custody decree where under
PKPA state issuing original decree retains exclusive
jurisdiction); TOgarBS-Vi-Wright. 9& N.M* 8, 644 P.2d 522, 524
ffffft (PKPA precluded modification of Utalr custody decree by New
Mexico where first prong of test was met but second prong was not
met) .

litigate custody where the child and family
have the closest connections and where
significant evidence concerning the child is
most readily available, discourage conflict
over custody, deter abductions and unilateral
removals of children, avoid relitigation of
another stated custody rulings, and promote
the exchange of information and mutual
assistance between different states[,]
State in Interest of D.S.K.. 792 P.2d 118, 123 (Utah App. 1990)
(citing Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-1 (1987)), or put more
succinctly, "to bring some semblance of order into the existing
chaos." Bodenheimer, Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction
and Continuing Jurisdiction under the UCCJA, 14 Fam. L.Q. 203,
214 (1981) [hereinafter Bodenheimer] (quoting UCCJA,
Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9 U.L.A. 114 (1979)). All fifty
states and the District of Columbia have adopted the UCCJA.
As to when a court in this state has jurisdiction over a
particular child custody matter, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(l)
(1987) provides:
A court of this state which is competent
to decide child custody matters has
jurisdiction to make a child custody
determination by initial or modification
decree if the conditions as set forth in any
of the following paragraphs are met:
(a) This state (i) is the home state of
the child at the commencement of the
proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home
state within six months before commencement
of the proceeding and the child is absent
from this state because of his removal or
retention by a person claiming his custody or
for other reasons, and a parent or person
acting as parent continues to live in this
state;
(b) It is in the best interest of the
child that a court of this state assume
jurisdiction because (i) the child and his
parents, or the child and at least one
contestant, have a significant connection
with this state, and (ii) there is available
in this state substantial evidence concerning
the child's present or future care,
protection, training, and personal
relationships;

(c) The child is physically present in
this state and (i) the child has been
abandoned or (ii) it is necessary in an
emergency to protect the child because he has
been subjected to or threatened with
mistreatment or abuse or is otherwise
neglected or dependent; or
(d)(i) It appears that no other state
would have jurisdiction under prerequisites
substantially in accordance with Paragraphs
(a), (b), or (c), or another has declined to
exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this
state is the more appropriate forum to
determine the custody of the child, and (ii)
it is in the best interest of the child that
this court assume jurisdiction.
In the present case, under subsection (a), Utah is the home
state5 of the children. However, the analysis does not end at
determining whether these jurisdictional requirements are met.
Section 78-45c-14(l) (1987)6 sets forth under what circumstances
a court in Utah may modify an out-of-state custody decree:
(1) If a court of another state has made a
custody decree, a court of this state shall
not modify that decree unless (a) it appears
to the court of this state that the court
which rendered the decree does not now have
jurisdiction under jurisdictional
prerequisites substantially in accordance
with this act or has declined to assume
jurisdiction to modify the decree and (b) the
court of this state has jurisdiction.

5. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-2 defines "home state11 as "the state
in which the child immediately preceding the time involved lived
with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at
least six consecutive months . . . ."
6. While this court has decided jurisdictional disputes under
the UCCJA without regard to section 14, see, e.g., Rawlings^v.
Weiner. 752 P.2d fin
(Utah App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278
(Utah 1988), we believe that such questions are more easily
answered by focusing on this section. See, e.g.T Rawlings, 752
P.2d at 1330-31 (Bench, J., concurring).

(Emphasis added). Under this section, both the requirements of
subsections (1)(a) and (b) must be met before Utah can modify a
decree from another state. Section 15 provides that the second
state will enforce the decree of the initial state as long as the
initial state retains custody jurisdiction. "When both states
have adopted the VCCJA, the apparent effect of §§ 14 and 15 is to
give continuing exclusive jurisdiction to the initial state as
long as that state retains a significant connection' basis for
jurisdiction." Meade v. Meade, 812 F.2d 1473, 1476-77 (4th Cir„
1987) . It makes no difference that Utah may have met the
jurisdiction prerequisites of section 3; section 14 must also be
satisfied in order for this state to modify the Montana award.8
7. We note that subsection 14 contains language similar to that
found in subsection (f) of the PKPA. While it was hoped that
subsection 14 of the UCCJA would eliminate the erroneous
assumption of concurrent jurisdiction, it proved to be an
imperfect remedy. Meade v. Meade, 812 F.2d 1473, 1476 (4th Cir.
1987); Bodenheimer, 14 Fam. L.Q. at 214. "While under the UCCJA
scheme some states profess to find modification jurisdiction so
long as they can properly exercise initial custody jurisdiction,
the PKPA prevents a second state from modifying an initial
state's order . . . ." Meade, 812 F.2d at 1476.
8. To read section 3 of the UCCJA, which merely addresses under
what circumstances a state may have jurisdiction, without the
qualifying language of section 14, as the dissent would have us
do, is to ignore the plain language of the Act. Scholars
addressing this very issue have commented that prior to the
UCCJA, "concurrent jurisdiction in several states to modify an
existing custody judgment was a major cause of parental resort to
kidnapping to gain a more favorable judgment in a new forum."
Bodenheimer, 14 Fam. L.Q. at 213-14. Therefore, section 14 is
the key provision to carry out the UCCJA's objective of
preventing jurisdictional conflict. Xd. at 214. This is
especially true, when as here, the question is not simply, does a
particular state have jurisdiction to make a custody decree, but,
does a particular state have jurisdiction to modify an existing
custody decree of another state.
While section 14 was overlooked by early cases under the
UCCJA, see, e.g., Wheeler v. District Court. 186 Colo. 218, 526
P.2d 658 (1974), and Howard v. Gish, 36 Md. App. 446, 373 A.2d
1280 (1977), the majority of states, including Utah, now
recognize the exclusive jurisdiction of the state which issued
the original decree. See, e.g., State in Interest of D.S.K., 792
P.2d at 128; Curtis, 789 P.2d at 724-25; Rawlinas v. Weiner, 752
P.2d 1327, 1330-31 (Utah App.) (Bench, J., concurring), cert,
denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). The dissent however, chooses
(continued...)

It is clear that in the case at bar, the requirement of
subsection (1)(a) is not met.
[T]he continuing jurisdiction of the prior
court is exclusive. Other states do not have
jurisdiction to modify the decree. They must
respect and defer to th.e prior state's
continuing jurisdiction.

Exclusive continuing jurisdiction
is not affected by the child's residence in
another state for six months or more.
Although the new state becomes the child's
home state, significant connection
jurisdiction continues in the state of the
prior decree where the court record and other
evidence exists and where one parent or
another contestant continues to reside. Only
when the child and all parties have moved
away is deference to another state's
continuing jurisdiction no longer required.
Bodenheimer, 14 Fam. L.Q. at 214-15 (quoted in State in Interest
of D.S.K., 792 P.2d at 124) (emphasis added). See also Rawlings
v. Weiner, 752 P.2d 1327, 1330-31 (Utah App.) (Bench, J.,
concurring), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). "As long
as the decree state retains jurisdiction there is no concurrent
jurisdiction to modify a decree under the UCCJA," State in
Interest of D.S.K.. 792 P.2d at 124 (citations omitted), and "as
long as one parent continues to reside in the original state and
maintains some contact with the child . . .[,]" Id. at 125,
jurisdiction remains in the decree state.
Mrs. Crump's argument that jurisdiction automatically
shifted to Utah, the new home state, when she and the children
moved there, is without merit. Mr. Crump continues to reside in
Montana, where the original custody decree was issued. Montana
has not relinquished jurisdiction, nor have the parties sought to
have Montana do so. Instead, Mr. Crump chose to petition the

8. (...continued)
to ignore Utah case law, and relies instead upon cases from
Indiana and Illinois to make the point that concurrent
jurisdiction does exist.

courts of Utah for a modification of custody.9 Therefore, under
the UCCJA, Montana has continuing exclusive jurisdiction and has
not declined to exercise its jurisdiction in this case.
CONCLUSION
While there is much confusion as to the applicability of the
UCCJA and the PKPA in child custody modification proceedings,
this is no excuse for counsel in these types of cases to totally
ignore the law. In the present case, we have no choice but to
dismiss the appeal because the courts of Utah do not have
jurisdiction to modify the Montana decree. The dissent is
disturbed that this result might require further proceedings.
However, if the proper procedures had been followed at the
outset, the dissent would have no basis for its complaint.
Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to modify Montana's
custody decree, we dismiss the appeal.

RUSSON, Judge (dissenting):
I dissent. In my opinion, the Utah District Court did
have jurisdiction in this matter and, further, had a right to
exercise its jurisdiction pursuant to the Uniform Child Custody

9. The dissent correctly points out that had the "stay-at-home
parent, of his or her own volition, moved from Montana, Utah
would then be able to exercise its jurisdiction." However, it
does not follow that "had the stay-at-home parent, of his or her
own volition, never asserted his or her custody rights in
Montana, Utah would also be able to exercise its jurisdiction."

Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA)1 and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act (PKPA).
The majority opinion fails to adhere to the plain and
unambiguous language of the UCCJA and the PKPA, as well as to
their spirit and purpose, in its erroneous determination that the
Utah District Court did not have jurisdiction to decide the
matter that was before it.2
I.

BACKGROUND

Prior to the UCCJA, there was constant conflict between
custody orders of states having concurrent jurisdiction. This
usually occurred when one parent moved from the state which
granted the divorce to a different state, and then filed an
action in the second state for custody of the minor children.
Where the children were present with that parent, either by
visitation or by having been taken there, that state naturally
had jurisdiction to deal with their custody. If the decree
entered was contrary to the decree of the original forum state,
then the parties (and the courts) were faced with the problem of
conflicting orders.
II.

JURISDICTION UNDER THE UCCJA
A. Section 3 of the UCCJA3

To solve this problem, the UCCJA was proposed and has now
been adopted in all fifty states and the District of Columbia.
It specifically recognizes that two states may have simultaneous

1. In Utah, the UCCJA is set forth in Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45c-1
to -26 (1987 and Supp. 1991). At all times relevant to this
case, the statutory language found in the 1987 version of the
statute governs. For the sake of consistency and clarity, all
sections of the UCCJA are cross-referenced to the corresponding
sections as set forth therein.
2. In order to properly understand the state and federal
responses to conflicts between states having concurrent
jurisdiction, one must be aware that the UCCJA was first proposed
in August 1968, while Congress did not enact the PKPA until
December 1980. Accordingly, these two documents will be
addressed chronologically.
3.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-3 (1987).

concurrent jurisdiction, but directs how such jurisdiction shall
be exercised:
(1) A court of this state which is
competent to decide child custody matters has
jurisdiction to make a child custody
determination by initial or modification
decree if the conditions as set forth in any
of the following paragraphs are met:
(a) This state (i) is the
home state of the child at the time
of commencement of the proceeding,
or (ii) had been the child's home
state within six months before
commencement of the proceeding and
the child is absent from this state
because of his removal or retention
by a person claiming his custody or
for other reasons, and a parent or
person acting as parent continues
to live in this state;
(b) It is in the best
interest of the child that a court
of this state assume jurisdiction
because (i) the child and his
parents, or the child and at least
one contestant, have a significant
connection with this state, and
(ii) there is available in this
state substantial evidence
concerning the child's present or
future care, protection, training,
and personal relationships;
(c) The child is physically
present in this state, and (i) the
child has been abandoned or (ii) it
is necessary in an emergency to
protect the child because he has
been subjected to or threatened
with mistreatment or abuse or is
otherwise neglected or dependent;
or
(d) (i) It appears that no
other state would have jurisdiction
under prerequisites substantially
in accordance with Paragraphs (a),
(b), or (c), or another state has
declined to exercise jurisdiction
on the ground that this state is
the more appropriate forum to

determine the custody of the child,
and (ii) it is in the best interest
of the child that this court assume
jurisdictionUtah Code Ann- § 78-45C-3 (1987) (emphasis added).
"Home state" is defined by the UCCJA to mean:
the state in which the child immediately
preceding the time involved lived with his
parents, a parent, or a person acting as
parent, for at least six consecutive months,
and in the case of a child less than six
months old the state in which the child lived
from birth with any of the persons mentioned.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-2(5) (1987).
The operation of section 34 was explained by the drafters
of the UCCJA, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, as follows:
Paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection
(a)5 establish the two major bases for
jurisdiction. In the first place, a court in
the child's home state has jurisdiction, and
secondly, if there is no home state or the
child and his family have equal or stronger
ties with another state, a court in that
state has jurisdiction. If this alternative
test produces concurrent jurisdiction in more
than one state, the mechanisms provided in
sections 66 and 7 7 are used to assure that
only one state makes the custody decision.

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-3 (1987).

5.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(a)(i), (ii) (1987)

6.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-6 (1987).

7.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-7 (1987).

Paragraph (2)8 comes into play either
when the home state test cannot be met or as
an alternative to that test. The first
situation arises, for example, when a family
has moved frequently and there is no state
where the child has lived for 6 months prior
to suit, or if the child has recently been
removed from his home state and the person
who was left behind has also moved away. See
paragraph (1),9 last clause. A typical
example of alternative jurisdiction is the
case in which the stay-at-home parent chooses
to follow the departed spouse to state 2
(where the child has lived for several months
with the other parent) and starts proceedings
there.
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, Comment at 20-21 (1968)
(emphasis added) (hereinafter Comment).
Thus, the plain language of section 310 and the comments
thereto provide that State Two has jurisdiction if it meets one
of the bases established in that section.
B. Other Sections of the UCCJA
Moreover, if Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3 (1987) is construed
otherwise, the remaining sections of the UCCJA fail to make sense
wherein they require that State Two shall stay proceedings if the
matter is pending in another state, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-6(3)
(1987); or may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if the first
state is a more appropriate forum, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-7
(1987); or may decline to exercise its jurisdiction if the
petitioner is guilty of improper conduct, Utah Code Ann. § 7845c-8(l) (1987); and shall not exercise its jurisdiction to
modify unless the interest of the child necessitates, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-45c-8(2) (1987). All of the foregoing are indicia of
jurisdiction: If a court does not have jurisdiction, it does not
have the power to stay proceedings, nor the power to decline to
exercise its jurisdiction, nor the power to proceed with the
proceedings even if to do so would be in the best interest of the
children's safety and well being. It would have no choice but to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.
8.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(a)(ii) (1987).

9.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(a)(i) (1987).

10.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-3 (1987).

However, a court does have these choices because the UCCJA
specifically confers jurisdiction on the second state where the
child and a parent have been living for at least six consecutive
months (home state), Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(1) (a) (1987); or
when it is in the best interest of the child to assume
jurisdiction because the child and at least one parent have a
significant connection with the second state and there is
substantive evidence in that state pertaining to the child's
care, protection, training and personal relationships, Utah Code
Ann. § 78-45c-3(1)(b) (1987); or in the case of an emergency,
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(1)(c) (1987); or when no other state
has jurisdiction or another state has declined to exercise
jurisdiction, Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-3(1)(d) (1987).
C. Utah Cases
The Utah. Supreme Court's holding in Tu^^le^y^~HeadersonT~628
E*^^P^3^B^t:iSai5 offers additional inSfgffTTrito the issue of
^fnc^rent jurisdiction under the UCCJA. In that case, the trial
court acknowledged that it had jurisdiction, but refused to
exercise it under the circumstances of that case. Id. at 1276.
Although Tuttle is a pre-UCCJA case, the court quoted extensively
from the UCCJA and found that the UCCJA provided persuasive
authority to support its affirmance of the trial court's holding
that it had concurrent jurisdiction. Id. at 1276-77.
Also instructive
is pthe
1
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2d Utah
1121 Supreme Court's holding in

copm^m^^^^ ^<

-

(«arri§5>> a post-uccjA

agBm^Wf^* mat" case, an action was filed by the Coppedges in
Oregon, to make them guardians of their grandson, who was living
with them in Oregon. In response, a custody action by the
child's parents was subsequently filed in Utah. The Utah Supreme
Court ordered the district court "to stay the Utah action to the
extent that it seeks to determine custody under the Uniform Act"
and "to communicate with che Oregon Court . . . to determine the
propriety of further proceedings in Oregon." Id. at 1122. The
district court was further instructed that "[i]n the event that
the Oregon court stays its proceedings after such communication,
then the Utah court may proceed to adjudicate the custody
matter." Id. If Utah did not have jurisdiction, then the
district court could not have been ordered to stay its
proceedings nor to proceed after communicating with Oregon. On
the other hand, if Oregon did not have jurisdiction, then the
Utah Supreme Court would have simply concluded such and ordered
the district court to proceed. The only conclusion that can be
drawn from this case is the existence of concurrent jurisdiction.
See also State in rnterest of W.D. v. Drake. 770 P.2d 1011, 1013
(Utah App. 1989) (under the facts of that case, Utah and
California had concurrent jurisdiction); Rawlinas v. Weiner, 752
P.2d 1327, 1331 (Utah App.) (Bench, J., concurring) (under the

facts of that case, Utah had primary jurisdiction and Washington
had secondary jurisdiction), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah
1988) .
III.

EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION

Once the jurisdictional requirements of the UCCJA have been
met, our inquiry then turns to the exercise of that jurisdiction*
Just because a state has jurisdiction does not mean that it can
exercise it as to custody. State Two "shall not exercise its
jurisdiction under this act if at the time of filing the petition
a proceeding concerning custody of the child was pending in a
court of another state exercising jurisdiction . . . ." Utah
Code Ann. § 78-45c-6(l) (1987). In such case, State Two "shall
stay the proceeding and communicate with the court in which the
other proceeding is pending to the end that the issue may be
litigated in the more appropriate forum . . . ." Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-45c-6(3) (1987). Secondly, a court may decline to exercise
its jurisdiction if it finds that it is an inconvenient forum.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-7(l) (1987). Thirdly, where State Two
has jurisdiction, it generally cannot modify the custody decree
of State One unless it appears to the court of State Two that
State One "does not now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional
requirements substantially in accordance with [the UCCJA] or has
declined to assume jurisdiction!;.]" Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c14(1)(a) (1987).11 Thus, even if jurisdiction is established
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3 (1987), Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45c6, -7, and -14 (1987) govern the exercise of that jurisdiction.
However, if both parents and the children move from the
state of the original decree, deference to that state's
jurisdiction is no longer required. State in Interest of D.S.K.,
792 P.2d 118, 124 (Utah App. 1990) (citing Bodenheimer,
Interstate Custody: Initial Jurisdiction and Continuing
Jurisdiction under the UCCJA. 14 Fam. L.Q. 203, 214-15 (1981)).
As the drafters7 comment to section 1412 states:

11. State Two may nonetheless proceed with matters other than
custody. As stated in Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-7(6) (1987),
"[t]he court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under this
act if a custody determination is incidental to an action for
divorce on another proceeding while retaining jurisdiction over
the divorce or other proceedings."
12.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-14 (1987).

Courts which render a custody decree
normally retain continuing jurisdiction to
modify the decree under local law. Courts in
other states have in the past often assumed
jurisdiction to modify the out-of-state
decree themselves without regard to the
preexisting jurisdiction of the other state.
See People ex rel. Halvev v. Halvev, 330 U.S.
610, 67 S.Ct. 903 (1947). In order to
achieve greater stability of custody
arrangements and avoid forum shopping,
subsection (a) declares that other states
will defer to the continuing jurisdiction of
the court of another state as long as that
state has jurisdiction under the standards of
the Act. In other words, all petitions for
modification are to be addressed to the prior
state if that state has sufficient contact
with the case to satisfy section 3.13 The
fact that the court had previously considered
the case may be one factor favoring its
continued jurisdiction. If, however, all the
persons involved have moved away or the
contact with the state has otherwise become
slight, modification jurisdiction would shift
elsewhere. Compare Ratner, Child Custody in
a Federal System, 62 Mich. L. Rev. 795, 82122 (1964).
For example, if custody was awarded to
the father in state 1 where he continued to
live with the children for two years and
thereafter his wife kept the children in
state 2 for 6-1/2 months (3-1/2 months beyond
her visitation privileges) with or without
permission of the husband, state 1 has
preferred jurisdiction to modify the decree
despite the fact that state 2 has in the
meantime become the "home state" of the
child. If, however, the father also moved
away from state 1, that state loses
modification jurisdiction interstate, whether
or not its jurisdiction continues under local
law. See Clark, Domestic Relations 322-23
(1968).
Comment at 32.
13.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-3 (1987).

Additionally, if the stay-at-home parent fails to assert his
or her custody rights, then State One's jurisdiction ceases:
[I]f the father in the same case continued to
live in state 1, but let his wife keep the
children for several years without asserting
his custody rights and without visits of
the children in state 1, modification
jurisdiction of state 1 would cease. Compare
Brenale v. Hurst, 408 S.W.2d 418 (Ky. 1966).
Id.
IV.

APPLICATION TO THE CASE AT BAR

Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, there is no
question but that the Utah District Court has jurisdiction under
the plain language of the UCCJA. Utah is the home state of the
children because they have lived here with their mother for over
two years, substantially longer than the six months required by
the UCCJA. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(a) (1987).
Furthermore, the children and Mrs. Crump have significant
connection with Utah and substantial evidence exists in Utah
concerning their training, care, protection and personal
relationships. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45c-l(l)(c), -3(b)
(1987). "Where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous,
[appellate courts] will not look beyond to divine legislative
intent. Instead, we are guided by the rule that a statute should
be construed according to its plain language." Allisen v.
American Legion Post No. 134. 763 P.2d 806, 809 (Utah 1988)
(citation omitted). Thus, we should hold that according to the
plain language of section 78-45c-3, the Utah district court and
this court have jurisdiction to hear this case.
Furthermore, although Mr. Crump has continued to live in
Montana, he came to Utah, docketed the Montana judgment in Utah,
petitioned the Utah Court to modify the Montana decree, and then
appealed that judgment to this court. The Utah District Court
had before it the children and mother who had lived in Utah for
over two years, and the father who petitioned the Utah court
seeking to modify the Montana custody decree. Such a scenario
was the subject of the drafters' comment to section 3,14 wherein
it stated: "A typical example of alternative jurisdiction is the
case in which the stay-at-home parent chooses to follow the
departed spouse to state 2 (where the child has lived for several
months with the other parent) and starts proceedings there."
14.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45C-3 (1987).

Comment at 21. That is exactly what we have in this case: Mr.
Crump (stay-at-home parent) chose to follow Mrs. Crump (departed
spouse) to Utah (where the children have lived for over two years
with their mother) and commence proceedings in Utah. This offers
further support for concluding that the district court had
jurisdiction to hear this case.
Having found that the jurisdictional requirements of the
UCCJA have been met, our inquiry turns to whether or not the Utah
court could exercise its jurisdiction. As noted above, if Mr.
Crump had, of his own volition, moved from Montana, Utah would
then be able to exercise its jurisdiction. Also, if Mr. Crump,
of his own volition, had never asserted his custody rights in
Montana, Utah would then be able to exercise its jurisdiction.
The question which remains for us is whether Utah should be able
to exercise its jurisdiction when Mr. Crump, of his own volition,
chooses to follow Mrs. Crump to Utah and bring suit here.
This very question was answered in wITliaifts^, Williams, 555
NrE.Zd 142 (Ind. 1990).15 In that case, the father lived in
Indiana'^yrth one child and the mother lived in Illinois with the
other child. She filed a petition in Indiana for custody of both
children. The Indiana court awarded custody of both children to
the father. The mother appealed, and the Indiana Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that because Illinois
was the home state of the one child, Indiana lacked jurisdiction
under the UCCJA to deal with custody.
The Supreme Court of Indiana reversed the court of appeals,
stating:
Once a court possesses subject matter
jurisdiction to consider the general class or
kind of case, its specific jurisdiction over
a particular case within the general class is
subject to waiver. In rState ex rel. Hiaht
v. Marion Superior Court, 547 N.E.2d 267, 270
(Ind. 1989)] we observed:
Ind. Code § 31-1-11.5-3(a)
and (b) empower a trial court to
hear causes of action for
dissolution and for child support.
15. Although Williams concerns an initial custody determination,
rather than modification of custody, it is nonetheless persuasive
because the UCCJA establishes the same jurisdictional standards
for child custody determinations by initial or modification
decree. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3(l) (1987).

Within this grant of subject matter
jurisdiction is the power to
determine child support. (Ind.
Code § 31-1-11.5-12), child custody
(Ind. Code § 31-1-11.5-20), and
visitation (Ind. Code § 31-1-11.524). By filing the dissolution
action, [the wife] engaged the
trial court's subject matter
jurisdiction to hear dissolution
cases, which includes the authority
to decide issues of child support
and visitation.

Resolution of the subject matter
jurisdiction issue involves determining
whether the claim advanced falls within the
general scope of authority conferred upon the
court by the constitution or statute. The
authority to hear child custody cases is not
directly granted by the UCCJA. Rather, Sec.
3(a) merely operates to restrict the existing
power of courts to hear custody cases. Ind.
Code § 31-1-11.6-3(a) begins:
A court of this state which is
competent to decide child custody
matters has jurisdiction to make
child custody determination by
initial remodification decree if:
[emphasis added]
The source of this competency to decide child
custody matters is found in Ind. Code § 31-111.5-2 0 and is an incidental grant of
specific authority within the general grant
of subject matter jurisdiction to hear
actions for dissolution and child support.
The jurisdictional limitations imposed by the
UCCJA are not equivalent to declarations of
subject matter jurisdiction, but rather are
refinements of the ancillary capacity of a
trial court to exercise authority over a
particular case. This exercise of authority
is waivable.

90

Because of the voluntary conduct of
Bonnie in affirmatively engaging the Indiana
courts to determine custody, and expressly
consenting to the trial court's authority to
determine custody, we find that she has
waived any question regarding the authority
of the court to decide the issue of custody
under the facts of her case and has thus
waived the trial court's jurisdiction over
her particular case.
Id, at 144-45 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
Also persuasive is the Indiana Court of Appeals' holding in
SchnffJ^er yi;:3X&tomi&e&^^
find. App. 1990) • In
cilWOMBrtahces similar to those in the case at bar, the court held
that under the UCCJA, Indiana had jurisdiction to modify a
Wisconsin custody decree because the stay-at-home parent
"voluntarily submitted himself to the trial court's
jurisdiction,11 Id. at 199, thereby raising an inference that the
parties considered Indiana to be the more appropriate forum. Id.
In the present case, this court raised sua sponte an
objection to jurisdiction, and now bases its decision on a lack
thereof. Instead, we should infer from Mr. Crump's decision to
come to Utah, docket the Montana judgment here, petition the Utah
Court to modify the Montana decree, and then appeal that judgment
to this court, that the parties before us consider Utah the more
appropriate forum in which to litigate this action. See^itTso In
re Manriacre of Slate. 53ff~!r.EU2ti; 894 (1X1. App. 1989) ("Under the
UCCJA, jurisdiction refers not to the due process limitations of
potential subject matter or personal jurisdiction, but instead to
the legislature's discretionary limitation upon the exercise of
existing jurisdiction. Thus the Act permits some discretion in
the trial court's determination of its jurisdiction to ensure
that jurisdiction takes place in the forum where the ties between
the State and the child and his family are the closest." Id. at
896 (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); In Re~ Marriage of
Weinstein, 408tf*E,2d952 (III* App. 1980) ("[W]here both
prospective custodians are present in a state and there is an
opportunity for a full hearing on the custody issue, the
jurisdictional requirements of the Uniform Act may be satisfied."
Id. at 956 (citing Bodenheimer, The Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act, 22 Vand. L. Rev. 1207, 1229 (1969)).
In our case, the district court was competent to decide
child custody matters under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (Supp.
1991) ("The district court has original jurisdiction in all
matters civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution
and not prohibited by law."); Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-1(1) (1989)

("Proceedings in divorce are commenced and conducted as provided
by law for proceedings in civil causes, except as provided by
this chapter."); and Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-1(5)(d) (1989) ("In
all actions the court and the judge have jurisdiction over . . .
the custody and maintenance of minor children[.]"). See also
Utah Const, art. VIII, § 5. Moreover, Utah has jurisdiction to
make child custody determinations under Utah Code Ann. § 78-4 5c-3
(1987). Since Mr. Crump voluntarily and affirmatively engaged
the Utah courts to modify the Montana decree, in doing so he
waived any question regarding authority of the Utah courts to
decide the issue under the facts of this case and has thus waived
any objection to the district court's authority to exercise its
jurisdiction over this particular case.
Furthermore, the majority opinion misconstrues the plain
language of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-14(l) (1987) in reaching its
erroneous conclusion that the said section strips Utah courts of
jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-14(l) (1987) provides:
If a court of another state has made a
custody decree, a court of this state shall
not modify that decree unless (a) it appears
to the court of this state that the court
which rendered the decree does not now
have jurisdiction under jurisdictional
prerequisites substantially in accordance
with this act or has declined to assume
jurisdiction to modify the decree and (b) the
court of this state has jurisdiction.
The plain language of this section recognizes that both states
can have concurrent jurisdiction: Montana has jurisdiction
because it made the custody decree, and unless Utah also has
jurisdiction under another section of the act, subsection (b)
above is meaningless. Thus, it is clear that this section does
not contain qualifying language that strips Utah courts of
jurisdiction, but instead addresses the exercise of that
jurisdiction.16
Although the majority opinion correctly states that
acquiescence of the parties is insufficient to confer
jurisdiction on the court, such is inapplicable here. The
parties are not purporting to confer jurisdiction upon the Utah
16. Additionally, it should be noted that the Utah district
court did not modify the Montana decree as to custody. While the
Utah court had jurisdiction to modify the Montana custody decree,
it chose not to because there had not been a substantial change
of circumstances.

courts. As shown above, Utah already had jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-45C-3 (1987). By coming to Utah, docketing the
Montana judgment here, petitioning the Utah District Court to
modify the Montana custody decree, and appealing that judgment to
this court, Mr. Crump did not purport to waive Montana's
jurisdiction, but simply waived any objection to Utah's authority
to exercise its jurisdiction.
V. JURISDICTION UNDER THE
PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT
Nor is Utah's jurisdiction prohibited under the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1991). In fact,
both the plain language of the statute and its spirit and
purposes support the conclusion that Utah has jurisdiction.
Subsection (f) of 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1991) contains language
similar to that found in Utah Code Ann. 78-45c-14(l) (1987).17
Subsection (f) provides:
A court of a State may modify a
determination of the custody of the same
child made by a court of another State, if
(1) it has jurisdiction to
make such a child custody
determination; and
(2) the court of the other
state no longer has jurisdiction,
or it has declined to exercise such
jurisdiction to modify such
determination.

—

As is the case with section 78-45c-14, this section does not
strip Utah courts of jurisdiction, but merely addresses the
exercise of that jurisdiction. The majority opinion acknowledges
as much wherein it states that the jurisdictional prerequisites
17.

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-14(l) (1987) provides:
If a court of another state has made a
custody decree, a court of this state shall
not modify that decree unless (a) it appears
to the court of this state that the court
which rendered the decree does not now
have jurisdiction under jurisdictional
prerequisites substantially in accordance
with this act or has declined to assume
jurisdiction to modify the decree and (b) the
court of this state has jurisdiction.

of subsection (1) have been met. Nonetheless, the majority
opinion then seems to contradict itself by reaching the
conclusion that despite the fact that subsection (1) has been
met, the Utah courts do not have jurisdiction.
Secondly, an examination of the purposes of the act support
Utah assuming jurisdiction under the circumstances of this case.
Those purposes include: (1) deterring interstate abductions,
(2) determination of custody by the state which can best decide
the case in the interest of the child, (3) facilitating the
enforcement of custody decrees of sister states, and (4)
promotion of greater stability of home environment. See
generally Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-611, § 7, 94 Stat. 3569 (1980). First, the case at bar does
not concern a parent that has abducted a child and moved
elsewhere to find a more favorable forum. Instead, we have a
very different scenario in which the stay-at-home parent has
affirmatively chosen to follow the departed spouse to the home
state of the children and bring suit there. Secondly, as
discussed above, since Mrs. Crump and the children have lived in
Utah for over two years, Utah is in the best position to decide
the case in the interest of the children. Thirdly, since the
Utah District Court did not modify the custody portion of the
Montana decree, its decision does facilitate enforcement of that
decree. Lastly, rather than promoting greater stability of home
environment, the majority opinion instead promotes the excessive
litigation that the act was created to curb.
VI.

CONCLUSION

I would hold that the trial court had jurisdiction, as
well as the right to exercise its jurisdiction in this matter.
Accordingly, I would hold that this court has jurisdiction to
hear the appeal, and that the matter should proceed on appeal.

Leonard H. Russon, Judge

18. While the result in this case in no way compels either party
to petition for certiorari in Utah, or modification in Montana,
resolution of this controversy may require such. This
possibility is particularly disturbing in light of the fact that
the children have already appeared twice before judges in two
states.

APP. 2.

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah UCCJA, Sections 78-45c-l-3, 7,
13 and 14
Utah Foreign Judgment Act, Section
78-22a-2, 3
PKPA, 28 U.S.C. Section 1738A,
including Congressional Findings
and Declaration of Purposes.

UTAH UCCJA
78-45c-l.

Purposes - Construction

(1) The general purposes of this act are to:
(a) avoid jurisdiction competition and conflict with
courts of other states in matters of child custody which have
in the past resulted in the shifting of children from state to
state with harmful effects on their well-being;
(b) promote cooperation with the courts of other states
to the end that a custody decree is rendered in that the state
which can best decide the case in the interest of the child;
(c) assure that litigation concerning the custody of a
child take place ordinarily in the state with which the child
and his family have the closest connection and where
significant evidence concerning his care, protection, training
and personal relationships is most readily available, and that
courts of this state decline the exercise of jurisdiction when
the child and his family have a closer connection with another
state;
(d)
discourage continuing controversies over child
custody in the interest of greater stability of home
environment and of secure family relationships for the child;
(e) deter abductions and other unilateral removals of
children undertaken to obtain custody awards;
(f) avoid relitigation of custody decisions of other
states in this state insofar as feasible;
(g) facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of
other states;
(h) promote and expand the exchange of information and
other forms of mutual assistance between the courts of this
state and those of other states concerned with the same child;
and
(i) to make uniform the law of those states which enact
it.

(2) This title shall be construed to promote the general
purposes stated in this section.
1980
78-45C-2. Definitions.
As used in this act:
(1) "Contestant" means a person, including a parent, who
claims a right to custody or visitation rights with respect to a
child;
(2) "Custody determination" means a court decision and court
orders and instructions providing for the custody of a child,
including visitation rights; it does not include a decision
relating to child support or any other monetary obligation of any
person;
(3)
"Custody proceeding" includes proceedings in which a
custody determination is one of several issues, such as an action
for dissolution of marriage, or legal separation, and includes
child neglect and dependency proceedings;

(4)
"Decree" or "custody decree" means a custody
determination contained in a judicial decree or order made in a
custody proceeding, and includes an initial decree and a
modification decree;
(5)
"Home state" means the state in which the child
immediately preceding the time involved lived with his parents, a
parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive
months, and in the case of a child less than six months old the
state in which the child lived from birth with any of the persons
mentioned.
Periods of temporary absence of any of the named
persons are counted as part of the six-month or other period;
(6)
"Initial decree" means the first custody decree
concerning a particular child;
(7)
"Modification decree" means a custody decree which
modifies or replaces a prior decree whether made by the court which
rendered the prior decree or by another court;
(8) "Physical custody" means actual possession and control of
a child;
(9) "Person acting as parent" means a person, other than a
parent, who has physical custody of a child and who has either been
awarded custody by the court or claims a right to custody; and
(10) "State" means any state, territory or possession of the
United States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the District of
Columbia.
1980
78-45c-3. Bases of jurisdiction in this state.
(1) A court of this state which is competent to decide child
custody matters has jurisdiction to make a child custody
determination by initial or modification decree if the conditions
as set forth in any of the following paragraphs are met:
(a) this state:
(i) is the home state of the child at the time of
commencement of the proceeding; or
(ii) had been the child's home state within six
months before commencement of the proceeding and
the child is absent from this state because of his
removal or retention by a person claiming his
custody or for other reasons, and a parent or
person acting as parent continues to live in this
state;
(b) it is in the best interest of the child that a court
of this state assume jurisdiction because:
(i) the child and his parents, or the child and at
least one contestant, have a significant connection
with this state; and
(ii) there is available in this state substantial
evidence concerning the child's present or future
care,
protection,
training,
and
personal
relationships;
(c) the child is physically present in this state or
this state is the most recent domicile of the mother prior to
the birth of the child, and:

(i) the child has been abandoned; or
(ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the
child because he has been subjected to or
threatened with mistreatment or abuse or is
otherwise neglected or dependent; or
(d)
(i) It appears that no other state would have
jurisdiction under prerequisites substantially in accordance
with Subsection (l)(a), (b), or (c), or another state has
declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that this
state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody
of the child, and
(ii) it is in the best interest of the child that
this court assume jurisdiction.
(2)
Except under Subsections (l)(c) and (d), physical
presence in this state of the child, or of the child and one of the
contestants, is not alone sufficient to confer jurisdiction on a
court of this state to make a child custody determination.
(3) Physical presence of the child, while desirable, is not a
prerequisite for jurisdiction to determine his custody.
1990
78-45C-7.

Declining jurisdiction on finding of inconvenient
forum - Factors in determination - Communication
with other court - Awarding costs.
(1) A court which has jurisdiction under this act to make an
initial or modification decree may decline to exercise its
jurisdiction any time before making a decree if it finds that it is
an inconvenient forum to make a custody determination under the
circumstances of the case and that a court of another state is a
more appropriate forum.
(2) A finding of inconvenient forum may be made upon the
court's own motion or upon motion of a party or a guardian ad litem
or other representative of the child.
(3) In determining if it is an inconvenient forum, the court
shall consider if it is in the interest of the child that another
state assume jurisdiction. For this purpose it may take into
account the following factors, among others:
(a) if another state is or recently was the child's home
state;
(b) if another state has a closer connection with the
child and his family or with the child and one or more of the
contestants;
(c) if substantial evidence concerning the child's
present or future care, protection, training, and personal
relationships is more readily available in another state;
(d) if the parties have agreed on another forum which is
no less appropriate; and
(e) if the exercise of jurisdiction by a court of this
state would contravene any of the purposes stated in Section
78-45C-1.
(4)
Before determining whether to decline or retain
jurisdiction the court may communicate with a court of another
state and exchange information pertinent to the assumption of

jurisdiction by either court with a view to assuring that
jurisdiction will be exercised by the more appropriate court and
that a forum will be available to the parties.
(5) If the court finds that it is an inconvenient forum and
that a court of another state is a more appropriate forum, it may
dismiss the proceedings, or it may stay the proceedings upon
condition that a custody proceeding be promptly commenced in
another named state or upon any other conditions which may be just
and proper, including the condition that a moving party stipulate
his consent and submission to the jurisdiction of the other forum*
(6) The court may decline to exercise its jurisdiction under
this act if a custody determination is incidental to an action for
divorce or another proceeding while retaining jurisdiction over the
divorce or other proceeding*
(7)
If it appears to the court that it is clearly an
inappropriate forum it may require the party who commenced the
proceedings to pay, in addition to the costs of the proceedings in
this state, necessary travel and other expenses, including
attorney's fees, incurred by other parties or their witnesses.
Payment is to be made to the clerk of the court for remittance to
the proper party.
(8) Upon dismissal or stay of proceedings under this section
the court shall inform the court found to be the more appropriate
forum of this fact, or if the court which would have jurisdiction
in the other state is not certainly known, shall transmit the
information to the court administrator or other appropriate
official for forwarding to the appropriate court.
(9) Any communication received from another state informing
this state of a finding of inconvenient forum because a court of
this state is the more appropriate forum shall be filed in the
custody registry of the appropriate court.
Upon assuming
jurisdiction the court of this state shall inform the original
court of this fact.
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78-45c-13. Recognition and enforcement of foreign decrees.
The courts of this state shall recognize and enforce an
initial or modification decree of a court of another state which
had assumed jurisdiction under statutory provisions substantially
in accordance with this act or which was made under factual
circumstances meeting the jurisdictional standards of the act, so
long as this decree has not been modified in accordance with
jurisdictional standards substantially similar to those of this
act.
1980.
78-45c-14.

Modification of foreign decree - Prerequisites Factors considered.
(1) If a court of another state has made a custody decree, a
court of this state shall not modify that decree unless (a) it
appears to the court of this state that the court which rendered
the decree does not now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional
prerequisites substantially in accordance with this act or has

declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree and (b) the
court of this state has jurisdiction.
(2) If a court of this state is authorized under Subsection
(1) and Section 78-45c-8 to modify a custody decree of another
state it shall give due consideration to the transcript of the
record and other documents of all previous proceedings submitted to
it in accordance with Section 78-45c-22.
1980

UTAH FOREIGN JUDGMENT ACT
78-22a-2. Definition - Filing and status of foreign judgments.
(1) As used in this chapter, "foreign judgment" means any
judgment, decreef or order of a court of the United States or of
any other court whose acts are entitled to full faith and credit in
this state.
(2) A copy of a foreign judgment authenticated in accordance
with an appropriate act of Congress or an appropriate act of Utah
may be filed with the clerk of any district court in Utah. The
clerk of the district court shall treat the foreign judgment in all
respects as a judgment of a district court of Utah.
(3) A foreign judgment filed under this chapter has the same
effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses,
enforcement, satisfaction, and proceedings for reopening, vacating,
setting aside, or staying as a judgment of a district court of this
state.
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78-22a-3. Notice of filing.
(1) The judgment creditor or attorney for the creditor, at
the time of filing a foreign judgment, shall file an affidavit with
the clerk of the district court stating the last known post-office
address of the judgment debtor and the judgment creditor.
(2) Upon the filing of a foreign judgment and affidavit, the
clerk of the district court shall notify the judgment debtor that
the judgment has been filed. Notice shall be sent to the address
stated in the affidavit. The clerk shall record the date the
notice is mailed in the register of actions. The notice shall
include the name and post-office address of the judgment creditor
and the name and address of the judgment creditor's attorney, if
any.
(3) No execution or other process for the enforcement of a
foreign judgment filed under this chapter may issue until 30 days
after the judgment is filed.
1986

PARENTAL KIDNAPPING PREVENTION ACT
S1738A.

Full faith and credit given to child custody
determinations.
(a) The appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce
according to its terms, and shall not modify except as provided in
subsection (f) of this section, any child custody determination
made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of
another State•
(b) As used in this section, the term (1) "child" means a person under the age of eighteen;
(2) "contestant" means a person, including a parent, who
claims a right to custody or visitation of a child;
(3) "custody determination" means a judgment, decree, or
other order of a court providing for the custody or
visitation of a child, and includes permanent and
temporary orders, and initial orders and modifications;
(4) "home State" means the State in which, immediately
preceding the time involved, the child lived with his
parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at
least six consecutive months, and in the case of a child
less than six months old, the State in which the child
lived from birth with any of such persons. Periods of
temporary absence of any of such persons are counted as
part of the six-month or other period;
(5) "modification" and "modify" refer to a custody
determination which modifies, replaces, supersedes, or
otherwise is made subsequent to, a prior custody
determination concerning the same child, whether made by
the same court or not;
(6) "person acting as a parent" means a person, or other
than a parent, who has physical custody of a child and
who has either been awarded custody by a court or claims
a right to custody;
(7) "physical custody" means actual possession and
control of a child; and
(8) "State" means a State of the United States, the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or
a territory or possession of the United States.
(c) A child custody determination made by a court of a State
is consistent with the provisions of this section only if (1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of such
State; and
(2) one of the following conditions is met:
(A) such State (i) is the home State of the child
on the date of the commencement of the proceeding,
or (ii) had been the child's home State within six
months before the date of the commencement of the
proceeding and the child is absent from such State
because of his removal or retention by a contestant
or for other reasons, and a contestant continues to
live in such State;

(B) (i) it appears that no other State would have
jurisdiction under subparagraph (A)f and (ii) it is
in the best interest of the child that a court of
such State assume jurisdiction because (I) the
child and his parents, or the child and at least
one contestant, have a significant connection with
such State other than mere physical presence in
such State, and (II) there is available in such
State substantial evidence concerning the child's
present or future care, protection, training, and
personal relationships;
(C) the child is physically present in such State
and (i) the child has been abandoned, or (ii) it is
necessary in an emergency to protect the child
because he has been subjected to or threatened with
mistreatment or abuse;
(D) (i) it appears that no other State would have
jurisdiction under subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or
(E), or another State has declined to exercise
jurisdiction on the ground that the State whose
jurisdiction is in issue is the more appropriate
forum to determine the custody of the child, and
(ii) it is in the best interest of the child that
such court assume jurisdiction; or
(E) the court has continuing jurisdiction pursuant
to subsection (d) of this section.
(d) The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a
child custody determination consistently with the provisions of
this section continues as long as the requirement of subsection
(c)(1) of this section continues to be met and such State remains
the residence of the child or of any contestant.
(e) Before a child custody determination is made, reasonable
notice and opportunity to be heard shall be given to the
contestants, any parent whose parental rights have not been
previously terminated and any person who has physical custody of a
child.
(f) A court of a State may modify a determination of the
custody of the same child made by a court of another State, if(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody
determination; and
(2) the court of the other State no longer has
jurisdiction, or it has declined to exercise such
jurisdiction to modify such determination.
(g) A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any
proceeding for a custody determination commenced during the
pendency of a proceeding in a court of another State where such
court of that other State is exercising jurisdiction consistently
with the provisions of this section to make a custody
determination.
(Added Dec. 28, 1980, P.L. 96-611, §8(a), 94 Stat. 3569*}

HISTORY; ANCILLARY LAWS AND DIRECTIVES
effective date of Section:
Act Dec. 28, 1980, P.L. 96-611, § 2,94 Stat. 3567, which appears as 42
USCS § 13951 note, provides that this section shall take effect on, and
apply to services furnished on or after July 1, 1981.
Other provisions:
Congressional findings and declaration of purposes. Act Dec. 28. 1980,
P.L. 96-611, § 7,94 Stat. 3568, effective on and applicable to services
furnished on or after July 1, 1981, as provided by § 2 of such Act, which
appears as 42 USCS § 13951 note, provides:
"(a) The Congress finds that "(1) there is a large and growing number of cases annually involving
disputes between persons claiming rights of custody and visitation
of children under the laws, and in the courts, of different States,
the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the
territories and possessions of the United States;
° (2) the laws and practices by which the courts of those
jurisdictions determine their jurisdiction to decide such disputes,
and the effect to be given the decisions of such disputes by the
courts of other jurisdictions, are often inconsistent and
conflicting;
"(3) those characteristics of the law and practice in such cases,
along with the limits imposed by a Federal system on the authority
of each such jurisdiction to conduct investigations and take other
actions outside its own boundaries, contribute to a tendency of
parties involved in such disputes to frequently resort to the
seizure, restraint, concealment, and interstate transportation of
children, the disregard of court orders, excessive relitigation of
cases, obtaining of conflicting orders by the courts of various
jurisdictions, and interstate travel and communication that is so
expensive and time consuming as to disrupt their occupations and
commercial activities; and
"(4) among the results of those conditions and activities are the
failure of the courts of such jurisdictions to give full faith and
credit to the judicial proceedings of the other jurisdictions, the
deprivation of rights of liberty and property without due process of
law, burdens on commerce among such jurisdictions and with foreign
nations, and harm to the welfare of children and their parents and
other custodians.
" (b) For those reasons it is necessary to establish a national system for
locating parents and children who travel from one such jurisdiction to another
and are concealed in connection with such disputes, and to establish national
standards under which the courts of such jurisdictions will determine their
jurisdiction to decide such disputes and the effect to be given by each such
jurisdiction to such decisions by the courts of other such jurisdictions.
M
(c) The general purposes of sections 6 to 10 of this Act [which, among
other things, enacted this note; for full classification, consult USCS Tables
volumes] are to " (1) promote cooperation between State courts to the end that a
determination of custody and visitation is rendered in the State
which can best decide the case in the interest of the child;
"(2) promote and expand the exchange of information and other forms
of mutual assistance between States which are concerned with the
same child;
"(3) facilitate the enforcement of custody and visitation decrees of
sister States;
"(4) discourage continuing interstate controversies over child
custody in the interest of greater stability of home environment and
of secure family relationships for the child;
"(5) avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict between State
courts in the matters of child custody and visitation which have in

the past resulted in the shifting of children from State to state
with harmful effects on their well-being; and
"(6) deter interstate abductions and other unilateral removals of
children undertaken to obtain custody and visitation awards.".
States encouraged to give priority to custody proceedings; award of expenses,
fees and costs. Act Dec. 28, 1980, P.L. 96-611, §8(c), 94 Stat. 3571, effective
on and applicable to services furnished on or after July 1, 1981, provides:
"In furtherance of the purposes of Section 1738A of title 28, United States
Code, as added by subsection (a) of this section [this section], State courts are
encouraged to "(1) afford priority to proceedings for custody determinations; and
" (2) award to the person entitled to custody or visitation pursuant
to a custody determination which is consistent with the provisions
of such section 1738A [this section], necessary travel expenses,
attorneys' fees, costs of private investigations, witness fees or
expenses, and other expenses incurred in connection with such
custody determination in any case in which "(A) a contestant has, without the consent of the person
entitled to custody or visitation pursuant to a custody
determination which is consistent with the provisions of such
section 1738A [this section], (i) wrongfully removed the child
from the physical custody of such person, or (ii) wrongfully
retained the child after a visit or other temporary
relinquishment of physical custody; or
M
(B) the court determines it is appropriate.".
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Robert Hunt, Esq.
Gridley, Echard & Ward
635 - 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Stephen W. Jewell, Esq.
Jenkins and Burbank
bl East 100 North
Logan, Utah 84321
Re:

Crump v. Crump, 900362-CA

Dear Counsel,
I am writing to confirm my telephone conversations with each of
you individually with respect to the above referenced matter.
As you know, oral argument herein is scheduled in the Utah Court
of Appeals on 27 August 1991. Prior to argument, the Court requests
a written response to its concerns about a potential jurisdictional
infirmity in the case. Specifically, the Court is concerned that it
may not have subject matter jurisdiction for reason of the
continuing jurisdiction of another state (Montana).
Enclosed for your reference is a copy of this Court's 1990
decision, In Re D.S.K. and C.R.K., which may be helpful as you
prepare your response. The Court requests that the responses be
filed on or before Tuesday, 20 August 1991.
As we discussed, the Court will not strike the matter from the
oral argument calendar. However, depending in part upon the written
responses, the Couit may treat argument as an order to show cause
hearing, requesting appellant to show cause why the appeal should
not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Sincerely,

Mary X1/ Noonan
CienK of the Court
MTN:kv
Enc.

